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SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS, A PROBLEM
WITHOUT A SOLUTION?
THE NATURE OF SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS
The fee ownership of land generally includes the soil and miner-
als thereunder.1 However, interests in land may be held in only a
stratum of the entire fee. There are then surface interests and sub-
surface interests. This is the case in a severed mineral situation. 2
This separation of interests can occur in several different ways. One
can reserve the mineral interests in a fee in himself when convey-
ing the fee to another and thereby create a profit in himself.3 An
easement can also be created by reservation of an interest in a deed
which conveys a fee.4 The most common result when mineral rights
are excepted in a transfer of real property, however, is the crea-
tion of a fee simple in the grantee as to the surface and a fee simple
in the grantor in the mineral interests.5 The end result of such
exceptions may be either a cloud on the title of the surface own-
er or an entire separate fee in a given parcel of land. Prolonged
experience with such excepted interests has shown that " 'mineral'
and 'royalty' rights cannot only become a cloud on title, but one
that cannot, under present law be removed by a trespass to try
title, or any other presently available legal procedure. . .,,
When one considers that the holder of this subsurface estate may
be someone who came by title through inheritance, and resides
thousands of miles away from the subsurface estate, this problem
becomes more apparent. In many instances the owner does not
even know of the existence of the estate to which he has succeeded.7
The North Dakota case of Wisness v. Paniman8 illustrates
1. See BLA-cK's LAW DICTIONARY, 742 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See a2so H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 585-89 (3rd ed. 1939).
2. H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 585 (3rd ed. 1939).
3. Rich v. Donaghey, 71 Oki. 204, 177 P. 86, 89 (1918).
4. W. BuRBY, REAL PROPERTY, Profits and Easements, § 27 p. 71 n 66 (3d ed. 1965).
5. See 36 AM. JUR. Mines and Minerals § 36 (1941).
6. Dupuy, Cloude on Title, 18 TEx. B.J. 275 (1955).
7. This is a very -possible situation since the estate is a real property interest. A
son might be devised all real property owned by his father, and never know the location
or extent of his property unless he searches diligently the extent of his father's holdings
and their whereabouts.
8. Wisness v. Paniman, 120 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 1963).
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one type of problem which a severed mineral interest creates. The
respondents (Paniman) were owners of non-participating oil and
gas leases in the property involved, and the plaintiff (Wisness) ac-
quired the land involved by way of tax deed. Wisness farmed the
land and paid taxes on it for a period of fifteen years. Oil and gas
production began on the land in 1959. In 1959 Wisness brought ac-
tion for quiet title through a claim of adverse possession, to the oil
and gas interests. The lower court dismissed the complaint and
quieted the title of the defendants to the royalty interests. The Su-
preme Court of North Dakota affirmed, even though the plaintiff
had been upon the land for longer than the statutory period re-
quired for an adverse possession title, and even though the owners
had not tried to assert their rights until the action for quiet title
had been commenced by the plaintiffs. 9 The result of the Wisness
case appears to be the thwarting of the adverse possession statute.0
THE GOAL OF MARKETABILITY
The goal of the attempted remedies discussed herein was to
eliminate the problems of title discussed above and establish a man-
ner of providing a marketable title to the land involved, i. e. re-
unite the surface and subsurface into one fee simple. The Supreme
Court of North Dakota has described a marketable title as
A title in fee simple, free from litigation, palpable defects,
and grave doubts; that is, a title which will enable the pur-
chaser not only to hold the land in peace, but will enable
him, whenever he may desire to do so, to sell or mortgage
the land to a person of reasonable prudence and caution.11
In examining what method may be used to attempt to attain a
marketable title, this paper will address itself only to the problems
involved when a fee in the subsurface minerals is created by ex-
ception in a deed conveying the surface estate. Profits or easements
created by exception or reservation will not be discussed, nor will
measures available for their elimination. Generally speaking, the
attempts at perfecting title to a parcel of land where a subsurface
fee also exists have been unsuccessful in North Dakota.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
The North Dakota Century Code provides:
9. Id. at 595.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-03 (1960) states in part, "A title to real property vested
in any person who has been or hereafter shall be either alone or including those under
whom he claims, in the actual open adverse and undisputed possession of the land under
such title for a period of ten years and who . . . shall have paid all taxes and assess-
ments legally levied thereon shall be valid in law."
11. Kennedy v. Dennstadt, 31 N.D. 422, 434, 154 N.W. 271, 274 (1915) citing Reynolds
v. Boul, 86 Cal. 538, 25 P. 67, 69 (1890).
NoTEs
A title to real property, vested in any person who has been
or hereafter shall be, either alone or including those under
whom he claims, in the actual open adverse and undisputed
possession of the land under such title for a period of ten
years and who, either alone or including those under whom
he claims, shall have paid all taxes and assessments legally
levied thereon, shall be valid in law. 2
As to what constitutes possession, the Code states:
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by
any person claiming a title founded upon a written instru-
ment or upon a judgment or decree, land shall be deemed
to have been so possessed and occupied in each of the fol-
lowing cases:
1. When it has been usually cultivated or improved;
2. When it has been protected by a substantial enclosure;
3. When, although not enclosed, it has been used for the
supply of fuel or of fencing timber for the purposes of
husbandry, or the ordinary use of the occupant; . . .i
and,
When there has been an actual continued occupation of
premises under a claim of title exclusive of any other right,
but not founded upon written instrument or upon a judg-
ment or decree, the premises actually occupied and no other
shall be deemed to have been held adversely. 14
In view of these statues it would appear that the plaintiffs in the
Wisness case had title. They seemed to be in actual possession, the
possession seemed to be adverse and undisputed and for the re-
quired period. They cultivated the land as required by the statute
and did not claim the oil and gas rights under a written instrument.
However, in North Dakota it has been held that, where the title to
the mineral right has been severed from the title to the surface,
possession of the surface by its owner is not adverse to the owner
of the minerals below it. The owner does not lose his possession
by any length of nonuse, and the surface owner cannot acquire title
to the minerals by adverse occupancy of the surface alone. 15 Thus,
possession of the surface is never possession of the subsurface for
purposes of adverse possession. In addition, "The fact that the sur-
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-03 (1960).
13. N.D. CENr. CODE § 28-01-09 (1960).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-10 (1960).
15. Bilby V. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956). See generally 1 AM. JuR. Adverse
Possession § 119 p. 858 n 15.
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face owner has no knowledge of the severance, or believes that
he owns the minerals, makes no difference.'
'16
It is arguable that the surface owner could utilize the statute by
actually possessing the minerals. He might mine coal for his own
use, for example, or take gravel from the subsurface. It is doubt-
ful that the mere sinking of a well would suffice because of the
lack of actual possession of the subsurface in that situation. An
additional problem might be the fact that the statutes cited deal
only with real property. In order for the surface owner to show
actual possession, it might be necessary for him to actually mine
the minerals and they might then become personal rather than real
property, and therefore nbt subject to the statute. Also, a surface
owner who knew that he didn't own the minerals and sought to
mine them for the purpose of satisfying the adverse possession
statute might run the risk of prosecution if the owner were to appear
and assert a claim prior to the running of the statutory period of
time. There is no case law indicating a successful adverse posses-
sion of the subsurface in North Dakota.
NORTH DAKOTA MARKETABLE TITLE ACT
A second possible solution to the problem posed by a severed
mineral estate is the North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act.7
Section one of the act provides:
Any person having the legal capacity to own real estate in
this state, who has an unbroken chai nof title to any interest
in real estate . . . under a deed of conveyance which has
been recorded for a period of twenty years or longer, and
is in possession of such real estate, shall be deemed to have
a marketable record title .... '18
There are provisions made in the chapter for the recording
of a claim of interest to prevent the statute's taking effect, 19
thereby destroying an ancient interest, and a section excepting
certain types of rights °.2 Attempted claims of title made by those
claiming title to subsurface estates by virtue of their occupancy
of surface estates have met with no success in the area of severed
mineral interests, however.
16. L. SIMES & C. TAYLoR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGIsLATION 245
(1960). See also American Law of Property § 10.7 (1952).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 47-19A (1960).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-19A-03, -07 (1960).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-11 (1960). The statute does not affect traditional prop-
erty interests such as reversion, remainder or a possibility of reverter or right of re-
entry for breach of condition. Also exempt are the contractual interests of mortgage,
trust deed and contract for sale (when not barred by the statute of limitations). The
statute does not apply to a title held by the state or federal government, nor to one held
by a railroad.
NoTEs
While a claim under an adverse possession statute fails because
possession of the surface is not adverse possession of the subsur-
face,21 under the Marketable Record Title Act, possession of the
surface is not possession of the subsurface at all, adverse or other-
wise. In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Advance Realty Co.,
22
the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated:
In order to come under the protection of this act, one
who claims an interest in real estate must have two qualifi-
cations. He must have an unbroken chain of title of record
and he must be in possession of the interest which he
claims. . . .By severance, separate estates are created and
each is incapable of possession by the mere occupancy of
the other. All that these defendants obtained was title to
the surface, which did not in any way give them possession
of the minerals .... It is not shown that any of such defend-
ants exercised any dominion over or possession of the min-
erals separate and apart from the surface estate. Thus,
we reach the conclusion that such defendants are not now in
possession of any interest in the minerals in the lands in-
volved. Therefore, the Marketable Record Title Act is not
applicable to and has no effect upon the title to the minerals
in question.
23
It was also held in Wichelman v. Messner24 that, "As owner of
a separate fee in a separate 'piece' of real property, the record
owner of the mineral rights does not have to file a statutory notice."2
5
Simes and Taylor have, in their recent book, suggested a Model
Marketable Title Act, to deal with problems of clouds and convey-
ancing complications, but concerning severed mineral interests,
they state:
In mineral areas, it may be desirable to make the Model
Marketable Title Act even more explicit in its application to
mineral interests. Again, it may be desirable to consider
legislation in addition to that act.
26
TAXATION OF SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS
North Dakota has attempted to deal with the problem of severed
mineral interests by taxation also. The theory seemed to be that if
such interests could be taxed, the interests could eventually become
21. Bilby V. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882, 889 (N.D. 1956).
22. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705 (N.D. 1956).
23. Id. at 719
24. Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800 (N.D. 1957).
25. Id. at 814. The filing of a notice of claim is provided for in N.D. CN'r. CODE §
47-19A-03 (1960).
26. L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING THROUGH LEGISLATION
246-47 (1960). See also Davis, Some Practical Aspects of Oil and Gas Title Examina-
tions in Nebraska, 34 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1954) ; Rummele, The North Dakota Marketable
Record Title Act, 41 N.D. L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1965).
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property of the county where they were located, as provided for by
North Dakota Century Code section 57-28-08. 2 The first attempted
tax came in 1923. The act provided for "[A]n annual state tax
of three cents on each acre . . . upon all deposits of lignite coal and
minerals and all titles to coal and minerals underyling any and all
lands, the ownership of which coal and minerals has been severed
from the ownership of the overlying strata and the surface of the
land. . ,,21 The act also provided for compilation and publication
to the owners2 9 of a list showing what taxes were owed by whom.8
Section five of the act then provided, in part, "If any such tax
shall remain unpaid for the period of three years after the same
becomes delinquent, the state auditor shall notify all persons ...
that unless paid within thirty days from the date of such notice,
proceedings will be taken to declare the title to said mineral re-
serve forfeited to the state." 31 Section six of the act then made
the state, upon non-payment, the absolute fee owner of the prop-
erty.3
2
In Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State3 3 this tax was at-
tacked in part, upon the grounds that it violated section 176 of the
North Dakota Constitution in that the tax was not uniform because
it taxed all mineral reserves alike, regardless of the value of the
reserves.
3 4
In upholding these contentions, the North Dakota Supreme
Court said:
It is . . . unreasonable and arbitrary to provide a classifi-
cation based upon the severance of ownership of minerals
from that of the surface. It is true that all owners of min-
erals severed from the surface are in the same class, but
that is not a classification of property but of persons. The
tax is not upon the person but on the property, and it is
27. The section provides:
The failure of the owner or any mortgagee, or other lien holder, to redeem such
lands before the period of redemption expires, shall operate:
1. To pass all of the right, title, and interest of the owner, mortgagee, or
lien holder in and to said premises, to the oounty by operation of law
28. COMP. LAWS OF N.D. § 2255al (1913-1925 Supp.).
29. OoMP. LAws OF N.D. § 2255a2 (1913-1925 Supp.).
30. COMP. LAWS OF N.D. §§ 2255a3 and 2255a4 (1913-1925 Supp.).
31 COMP. LAws OF N.D. § 2255a5 (1913-1925 Supp.).
32. ComP. LAWS OF N.D. § 2255a6 (1913-1925 Supp.).
33. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 220 N.W. 436 (1928).
34. Id. at 437. Section 176 of the Constitution of North Dakota reads:
Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property including fran-
chises within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. The legis-
lature may by law exempt any or all classes of personal property from
taxation and within the meaning of this section, fixtures, buildings and
improvements of every character, whatsoever, upon land shall be deemed
personal property. The property of the United States and of the state, coun-
ty, and municipal corporations and property used exclusively for schools,
religious, cemetery, charitable or other public purposes shall be exempt from
taxation. Except as restricted by this Article, the legislature may provide
for raising revenue and fixing the situs of all property for the purpose of
taxation. Provided that all taxes and exemptions in force when this amend-
ment is adopted shall remain in force until otherwise provided by statute.
456
NOTES
the property that must be placed in reasonable classes for
the purposes of taxation. To be uniform property taxes must
be laid with regard to the value, or some other character-
istic of the property which justifies classification. The tax in
question is not uniform upon the same class of property
in the taxing territory as required by section 176 of the Con-
stitution and is therefore void.
3 5
The Court felt that the tax violated section 176 because the
classification made for the purpose of the tax by the statute was
a classification of persons, not of property. It was the owners who
had severed or nonsevered interests, not the property, yet it was
property which was being taxed. The result was tax upon property
which had not been uniformly classified as required by the North
Dakota Constitution.
The second attempt at taxation of severed mineral interests in
North Dakota came in 1947. In that statue,3 6 in order to avoid the
problems encountered in the 1923 tax, the legislature called the tax
a tax on the privilege of holding mineral rights rather than a prop-
erty tax.3 7 It also changed the basis of assessment and only taxed
undeveloped mineral reserves. 3
In Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County39 this tax
was successfully attacked as being unconstitutional. The North Da-
kota Supreme Court largely disregarded the distinction whether the
tax was an excise tax or a property tax. It held that section 176 of the
North Dakota Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution require that the tax be assessed in a manner
which is not a purely arbitrary classification which denies equal
protection of the laws. 40 In striking down the tax the Court focused
upon the exemption of certain holders of mineral interests from
paying any taxes.
Since it is clear that the tax statutes before us apply a flat
rate of three cents per acre solely to the mineral rights un-
developed by mining operations and severed from the over-
lying strata or surface rights by an express reservation of.
such mineral right in the deed conveying the surface rights,
the said tax statutes are discriminatory, unreasonable and
arbitrary and in violation of the rights granted all persons
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
and are void.
41
35. Northwestern improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 220 N.W. 436, 439 (1928).
36. N.D. Rnv. CODE of 1943 §§ 57-4901, -4903 (1949 Supp.).
37. N.D. REv. CODE of 1943 § 57-4901 (1949 Supp.).
38. Id.
89. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543
(1951).
40. Id. at 548.
41. Id. at 550, 651.
457
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The Court here felt that to tax only the undeveloped mineral
rights when the ownership of them was in a person other than the
surface owner, and not tax the developed mineral rights was dis-
criminatory. The two Northwestern cases, when read together, in-
dicate the difficulty of taxing severed mineral estates in North Da-
kota. According to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the classifica-
tion must be made upon the property, not upon the nature of owner-
ship. The second decision says that a classification of property into
developed mineral interests and undeveloped mineral interests,
owned by someone other than the surface owner, is discriminatory.
Apparently developed mineral estates and undeveloped mineral es-
tates must be taxed alike. This is impossible because the value of
a mineral estate is difficult, if not imposssible, to calculate before
development.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
During the 1968 session of the North Dakota Legislative Assembly
a bill was introduced, portions of which dealt with disposal of
severed mineral interests in this state. The bill passed the Senate,
but was defeated in the House.
4 2
The bill provided for an assumption that severed mineral inter-
ests are abandoned unless (1) the mineral interest has been separately
assessed for real property taxation and the taxes are not delinquent
(2) the interest has been mortgaged, leased, conveyed, or devised
(and such transaction has been recorded) in the last thirty years
(3) minerals, in paying quantities have been produced from the in-
terest in the last thirty years, or (4) the owner has, by affidavit, in-
dicated a desire to preserve his interest.
4 3
Under the terms of the bill, any person could request to have
any severed mineral interest declared abandoned; and, if found
abandoned, the state would take custody of the interest. An annual
report is provided which lists all mineral production in the state,
including premises producing minerals in paying quantities where
the mineral ownership has been severed. 44 Once the property is
declared abandoned, the register of deeds of the county wherein
the mineral interests are located would issue a deed of trust to the
administrator of the trust set up for the property taken into cus-
tody.4 5
42. Sen. Res. 38 passed the Senate on Tuesday, February 6, 1969. See N.D.S. JouR. 839
(1969), and was defeated in the House on Saturday, March 15, 1969. See N.D.H.R. JOuR.
1344 (1969).
43. Sen. Res. 38 § 10.
446 Id. § 15.
45. Id. § 19. The section provides, in part, "[T]he register of deeds shall issue a deed
of trust to the administrator, placing it of record, which shall convey such mineral in-
terests free of all incumbrances whatsoever to the state as trustee to hold for the ben-
fit of the owner."
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This would take place only after publication of a notice in the
county wherein the last known owner resided. The notice would
contain a statement that if not claimed within 90 days, the property
would be placed in the custody of the administrator not later than
120 days after the publication.4 c The deed received by the state as
provided for in section 19 grants the power to the state to "receive
the rents, and profits of such mineral interests presumed aban-
doned, and to lease such mineral interests and take custody of the
proceeds. . . ." ' The state holds as trustee for the benefit of the
former owner; however, once custody has been taken by the ad-
ministrator, the owner of the interest is not entitled to the profits
earned by the property.
48
The state may not sell these abandoned mineral interests,
4 9
but if a claimant to the interest files a claim as provided for in the
act,50 the administrator must convey the interest to the claimant in
satisfaction of his claim.51
A number of criticisms may be made of Senate Bill Number
Thirty-eight. First, by returning the interest to a claimant who
proves a valid claim, the custodial period would do nothing to
enhance the marketability of the surface estate, or erase the severed
mineral estate. If the purpose was to provide a holder of record
title so that potential developers of mineral reserves found in North
Dakota would have someone from whom to lease the mineral
rights, the purpose is again defeated by section 24 of the act be-
cause a developer of mineral reserves would certainly be reluctant
to enter into an agreement with an owner who is legally bound to
convey the property to another party upon proof of a claim of
ownership. Since the lease is not only a concept of property law,
but of contract law also, problems of privity might arise once the
property has been reconveyed to its owner. What if the claimant has
leased the mineral rights to another party? What if the reinstated
owner refuses to continue the lease between himself and the state's
lessee after expiration of the lease? Under section 19, the state
would hold as trustee for the benefit of the owner and take custody
of the mineral proceeds, but section 20 of the act provides that the
owner is not entitled to receive income or other increments ac-
46. Id. § 16.
47. Id. § 19.
4,8. Id. § 20. The section provides, "When custody of severed mineral interests Is
taken or personal property Is paid or delivered to the administrator under this Act, the
owner is not entitled to receive income or other increments accruing thereafter."
49. Id. § 21 (1). The section provides, "All abandoned property other than noney de-
livered to the administrator, and severed mineral interests taken Into custody may be
sold .... .(emphasis added).
50. Id. § 23. A claim can be filed under the act by, "Any person claiming at any time
an interest In any property delivered to the state under this Act .... "
51. Id. § 24(2). The section provides, in part, "If the claim allowed Is for severed
mineral interests which have been taken into custody by the state, such Interest shall be
conveyed to the claimant in satisfaction of the claim."
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cruing when custody of mineral interests is taken by the state.52
Since the apparent reason for proposing a custodial statute was to
avoid a taking, this purpose also is defeated because the retention
of the profits of property to which one is entitled is probably no
less a taking than is retention of the property itself. Finally, the
very premise that the statute is built upon, i. e. a presumption of
abandonment is faulty. It is essential to the concept of abandonment
that there be relinquishment coupled with an intent to permanantly
quit the property.53 Thus, abandonment is an affirmative act. The
purpose of the proposed legislation is to deal with the owner who
does not know of the interest he possesses. It is questionable
whether one can abandon property of which he has no knowledge.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
For the reasons stated, it is probably best that the proposed
legislation was not passed. There are other possible solutions, how-
ever, which merit consideration. Section 38-13-01 of the North Da-
kota Century Code states:
Where any undivided mineral, leasehold or royalty interest
in land is claimed or owned by a person whose place of
residence and whereabouts is unknown, and cannot reason-
ably be ascertained, the district court of the county in which
the said land or a portion thereof is situated shall have the
power to declare a trust in the interest of such owner or
claimant and appoint a trustee therefor. Upon satisfactory
proof made by the petitioner that a diligent but unsuccessful
effort to locate such owner or claimant has been made and
that it will be in the best interest of all owners of interests
in said lands, the court shall authorize such trustee to exe-
cute and deliver an oil, gas or other mineral lease, an as-
signment of leasehold interest, a ratification, division orders
or other related documents or instruments, on such terms
and conditions as the court may approve.54
Although the statute makes no distinction between severed and
nonsevered mineral interests, there seems to be no bar to its ap-
plication to severed mineral interests. The section contemplates the
situation where more than one party owns the property, and the
whereabouts of one or more owners is unkown. Anyone who owns
an interest in the land involved can institute proceedings to have
such a trust declared.5 5 Finally, there is no question of a taking
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-13-02 (1969).
52. Id. § 20. "When custody of severed mineral interests is taken or personal property
is paid or delivered to the administrator under this Act, the owner is not entitled to re-
ceive income or other increments accruing thereafter."
53. State v. Murry, 195 Wis. 657, 219 N.W. 271, 272 (1928).
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 88-13-01 (1969).
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involved in this statute because the income is held in trust to be
paid to the owner of the interest once he is located.56
These provisions would be available in situations where the
ownership of a severed mineral estate has been divided; such a
result is not unlikely because the interest will probably have passed
by intestacy to heirs of the former owner. This is especially true
if the owner had no knowledge of the interest when he died. If
one of the heirs becomes aware of the interest, there seems to be
no bar to his invoking the statute.
Another possible, though somewhat awkward remedy has been
suggested in connection with a marketable title act.57 If 0, the
owner of Blackacre, executes to A a mineral deed conveying one-
fourth of all minerals in Blackacre and later executes to X a deed
purporting to convey all mineral interests in Blackacre to X, after
the statutory period had run, X could claim a perfected title under
the deed conveyed to him by 0.58
If this example is an accurate description of the operation of
the act, then the owner of the original fee in all the land could be
located, or his successor in interest, and he could convey to the per-
son seeking to utilize the minerals a deed conveying all ownership
in them to that person. There is, after all, no limitation of the opera-
tion of a marketable title act to a bona fide purchaser.
There are obvious limitations upon this suggestion, however.
First, it will not work in the case of a grantor who excepted all of
the mineral interests in the original grant because then there is
no conflict of ownership or defect of title. (Complete exception of
the mineral interests is the usual situation in North Dakota.)
Also, if a case did arise where the example would apply, the
person seeking to obtain a perfected title to the minerals would have
to wait the statutory period before he had such a title. 9
Probably the best solution to the problem would be to devise
a constitutional tax, which would be effective to cause the interest
to be forfeited for nonpayment of the tax. In declaring the 1923
tax invalid, the Supreme Court of North Dakota did not hold that
any tax on severed mineral interests was invalid. It merely said
that it must be uniform.
To be uniform property taxes must be laid with regard to
the value, or some other characteristic of the prop-
.erty . .. 60
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-13-03 (1969).
57. Barnett, Marketable Title Act-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 54 CoRNELs L. Rxv. 45
(1967).
58. In North Dakota one has a marketable title If his claim of title is unbroken
for 20 years so long as the deed is recorded, and he is in possession. N.D. CENT. CODE
47-19A-01, 02 (1960).
59. In North Dakota that period is twenty years. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
60. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State, 57 N.D. 1, 220 N.W. 436, 439-40 (1928).
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In addition, the decision in Northwestern Improvement Co. v.
Morton County,61 which struck down the 1947 tax held, citing State
v. Wetz, 62 that it is no longer the rule of section 176 of the North
Dakota Constitution that all property taxed be taxed uniformly, ac-
cording to its true value. The only limitation upon the classification
of property for taxes is the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution which forbids the classification to be arbitrary.6 3 With
the requirement of uniformity of evaluation relaxed, it would per-
haps be easier to devise a carefully drafted statute taxing severed
mineral interests in such a manner as to meet the requirements
of the Due Process Clause. A statute drafted in such a manner
that severed and non-severed ownership of minerals was treated
alike would overcome the problem of being discriminatory. In order
to devise such a tax, the levy would have to fall upon the owner-
ship rather than upon the development of the interest. Probably the
best statute would be one charging a uniform rate for the privilege
of owning a mineral interest. This would prevent any claim of dis-
crimination, and, if the question arose, prevent a claim of lack of
uniformity.
The next obstacle would be to show that the tax was levied with
regard to the value or some other characteristic of the property,
as required by the Court in Northwestern Improvement Co. v. State,
above. In that regard, the characteristic of the property upon which
the tax was laid could arguably be that the property had mining re-
serves beneath its surface. There was no statement by the Court
requiring that the characteristic had to be related to the value of the
property. Thus, the tax would be upon the privilege of owning
mineral interests and the characteristic of the property upon which
the tax was laid would be the presence, actual or potential, of
mineral reserves.
Another possible solution might be a revision of the North Da-
kota Marketable Record Title Act discussed above. As indicated
by the Supreme Court of North Dakota in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. Advance Realty Co., a claimant under the North Dakota Act
must be in possession of the estate he claims.6 4 However, if the Act
were amended so that the only requirement was that a claimant had
a root of title, clear of any defect, for the statutory period, a claim-
ant with a record title not showing that the mineral interests were
severed from the surface estate would have a clear title to the
entire parcel of land. Possession would be of no consequence, so
long as the claimant's recorded title was clear of a reference to the
61. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543(1951).62. State v. Wet., 40 N.D. 299, 168 N.W. 835 (1918).
63. Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Morton County, 78 N.D. 29, 47 N.W.2d 543
(1951).64. Northern Pac, 1RY. Co, v, Advance Realty Co., 78 N.W.2d 705, 119 (N.D. 1956).
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severed mineral interests, and was of record for twenty years or
more so that it would serve as a root of title.
65
It is not the belief of this writer that the possible solutions
suggested herein are the only solutions. It is, however, believed
that they are the only large scale solutions. Quit claim deeds, curative
acts, or title insurance might prevent disputes or law suits between
prospective grantors and grantees, but they can do little to elimi-
nate the separate estate. The existence of that estate is the focal
point of this paper.
With the coming of the mining industry to North Dakota, these
obscure clauses in conveyances have proved to be extremely trouble-
some. A developer is justifiably reluctant to purchase mineral
rights from a surface owner with such a clause in his chain of
title, and unless the Legislature is able to find some effective and
Constitutional manner of providing for their removal, these severed
mineral interests may cause a slowing or ceasation of the mining
industry in this state.
DWIGHT F. KALASH
65. The Model Act set forth in L. SImEs & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPROVING OF CONVEYANCING
BY LEGISLATURE (1960), is an example of a Marketable Title Act with no requirement of
possession.
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